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The Battlefields of KwaZulu-Natal and
the Revision of South African History
James von Geldern
Blacks, British, Boers . . . and blood; the history of our troubled country is
steeped in the stuff, as Africans fought one another, the Boers fought the
British, and both fought the Africans. There are, sadly, few moments in our
past of which we can be jointly proud as a nation.1

T

hus begins The Reader’s Digest History of South Africa: The Real
Story (1989), the first and most widely read revision of South African
history to appear under apartheid. Lamenting the absence of moments
of shared pride, the editors of the volume saw their contribution to be
a revision of the past to provide such moments. Yet first they had to
rediscover history, to write history where the slate had been intentionally wiped clean. Just as the 19th century Boer pioneers, the
voortrekkers, pushed their way into the present KwaZulu-Natal, claiming it to be empty of man and civilization, the apartheid history of
South Africa had been written on a blank and seemingly virgin tablet.
Though subject to contestation within the white community, the narrative served to legitimize and reinforce white rule. It told of enlightened
intervention in a dark and benighted hinterland, the inscription of civilization over savagery and unsettled lands. Driven by the British
imperialists and led forward into the hinterland by God, the Boers
came upon the rich veld inhabited by naught but the cruel Zulu, who
succumbed to the superior arms and strategies of the Europeans. This
narrative, passed along in oral histories, recorded in school textbooks,
and frozen in the white marble of the Voortrekker Monument, survived many generations and retellings. It served as a myth of origin
and mission for the Afrikaans-speaking white population and was, in
fact, the sole history of the South African republic.
There is, of course, some debate over how much revision the
voortrekker legend needs. The most radical suggestion, made in the
months after the changeover of power and bandied about in the conversations of white residents of KwaZulu-Natal, was to melt down the
sixty-four bronze wagons of the famous Blood River Monument. This,
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too, would have left a gap in history. More effective strategies questioned how history was told, and how it legitimized the presence of the
settlers in the interior of South Africa. In particular, revisionists examined the ways in which the African populations of the country were
marginalized from their own history, and how their own struggles and
battles during the 19th century were narrated in apartheid historiography.
*****
The present essay will look at two conflicts at the heart of South
African history. The first is the famous Battle of Blood River, which
took place outside the present town of Dundee in western KwaZuluNatal in 1838. This was one of the first military encounters between
Africans and the Boer pioneers moving into the interior, which ended
in total victory for the white settlers. The deeply religious Boers
ascribed the victory not to their superior weaponry but to the agency
of God, which reinforced their determination to dominate the African
peoples. The second bloody if less decisive encounter took place much
later, during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, on the slopes of Isandlwana,
where a contingent of 20,000 Zulu warriors surprised and destroyed
an encampment of British soldiers. Few of the British soldiers survived. Yet African soldiers of the Natal Native Contingent succeeded
in evading their pursuers and reached the reinforced mission church at
Rorke’s Drift ten miles away, which was successfully defended that
same evening against a large detachment of the same Zulu formation.
These battles force themselves onto the attention of anyone narrating South African history, and are particularly demanding of those
today who seek a pan-South African consciousness based on reconciliation. They offer stories of conflict and dominance, not of reconciliation; and the voices telling the tales often refuse to acknowledge the
presence of others in the formative moments of the country. Yet there
is no South African narrative of origin without them. These great battles brought South Africa into being as a political and social entity.
There is little way to speak of the formation of South African state and
society, or to narrate the relations between races and ethnic groups,
without referring back to the events. Before the Boers intruded into the
interior, there was no South Africa—neither a proto-African entity nor
an appendage of the British Empire. Any history to be at the heart of
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the nation-building program must deal with this impediment to reconciliation.
The settler myth in South Africa is founded, as it is in the United
States, on the notion of an uncivilized frontier, which is imagined to be
at once peopled and unpeopled. The unspoiled frontier imbued the
settlers with a sense of divine intervention; and yet the confrontation
with the peoples there gave them a sense of legitimacy won in struggle. As the voortrekkers moved into the interior in the year 1838, they
encountered native resistance in a series of battles. The culmination of
these skirmishes was the famous Battle of Blood River, fought in
December and resulting in total victory for the settlers. From that
moment on, whites were able to advance into the interior with greatly
diminished resistance. Few moments in South African history are so
encrusted with mythology. White and black would agree on the centrality of the event to the history, though not on its reading. Different
though the recountings of the battle are, more different still are the
contexts in which the battle is framed. This concerns most of all the
nature of the untouched interior space.
The history of the interior in its apartheid telling allowed for a double erasure of the veld space, for the removal of two cultures from the
future frontier in preparation for the arrival of white Europeans. The
thrust of the apartheid narrative was to delegitimize the cultures that
preceded white settlement. The first culture to be removed was the
most savage of all, the cannibal culture that according to some tellings
was a permanent fixture of the region, in fact, even a representative
culture. Local historical societies are prominent in telling this tale. The
renowned Talana Museum in Dundee is a museum of local culture,
meaning the culture of the Natal region. Located on a turn-of-the-century homestead, it has extensive exhibits on the Anglo-Zulu and
Anglo-Boer Wars; white domestic culture of the late 19th century; and
mining culture and history up until the present. It has mannequin
exhibits of two African cultures, the Bushmen of the Cape peninsula
and the Zulu, complete with domestic and military implements.
Alongside them is an extensive explanation of the cannibal cultures
discovered and destroyed by the early 18th century Zulu incursion.
Local farmers, encouraged by the supposed discovery of cannibal
remains in a cave in 1961, organize private “cannibal hikes” on their
property.2 Removed from historical context (in particular the exceptionally severe droughts of 1807 to 1810 and 1820 to 1823), cannibalism
becomes an inherent feature of local African culture.3

326

James von Geldern

More central to the tale and more problematic for African accounts,
above all to the Zulu, is the so-called mfecane. European pioneers arriving in the interior found a devastated human geography, with signs of
large-scale killing and migration. If they felt that this was a territory
open to new settlement, it was only because some mysterious hand
had cleared the previous inhabitants out. This mysterious hand, as
became evident, belonged to the Zulu, led by their chief Shaka. As did
so many European colonizers, the Boers experienced and understood
their native encounters in an ahistorical framework. Customs and circumstances that were historically determined, and often of recent origin, were described by their first white observers as eternal attributes
of unchanging clan formations. This left the Boer settlers unprepared
for their encounter with the Zulu, since they came into the region at a
moment of intense historical development.
The decades prior to white settlement had seen the consolidation of
what would be called the Zulu kingdom under the leadership of
Shaka. Once disparate tribes that had been driven into proximity by
population pressures were conquered and united under the Zulu
aegis, and a new system of military training spurred the growth of a
large army. Their power expanded to the south and west, where new
groups were encountered, including the amaHlubi, the amaNgwane,
who came to rest beneath the mountains upcountry, the amaChunu
and the abaThembu, who settled along the middle Thukela, and the
amaQadi at the coast. Some of these populations were incorporated
into the growing political body while others fled. The path of flight
went through other populated areas, leading to a chain of armed conflicts between fugitive and settled populations. If the Zulu accounting
is rare, it is because the mfecane places them in the uncomfortable role
of imperial conqueror precisely at the advent of their own conquest by
the whites. Thus, it has been left to the white South Africans to narrate
this story. The context of cannibalism and the mfecane makes the
voortrekkers into two seemingly contrary, but equally positive historical agents. First, it introduces them into virgin territory that was open,
rich, and beautiful. Second, it makes them only the last of the conquerors of the territory, distinguished by their enlightenment and
mildness.
Blood River was the last of a series of battles that took place
throughout 1838, as the voortrekkers turned west and into the interior.
Each skirmish, as the telling goes, found an embattled laager of Europeans staving off the brutal and seemingly unjustified attacks of the
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Zulu. The final conflict of the year, decisive not only in securing the
lives and lands of the early voortrekker bands but in setting the future
tone of relations, took place at Blood River on December 16, 1838. In
the most celebratory versions, whites have told a tale of African barbarity and perfidy, and the ultimate triumph of European power by
dint of perseverance and the grace of God.
The apartheid narration of the story, whether frozen in the marbles
of the Voortrekker Monument, filmed in such classics of South African
cinema as Die Voortrekkers (Winning a Continent) (1916),4 or reenacted in
the rituals of the Day of the Vow (December 16), features not only the
victory of arms, but the Zulu perfidy preceding it. In this narrative,
Dingaan, chief of the Zulu, signed a pact with the Boer leader Piet
Retief that granted land to the settlers. Yet this was only a ruse, for at
the conclusion of the signing, Dingaan ordered his warriors to slaughter the Boer delegation. A fictional version, told in Marie, H. Rider
Haggard’s famous Allan Quatermain novel, goes thus:
For some time—ten minutes, I dare say—the dancing and beer-drinking
went on. Then Dingaan rose from his chair and shook the hand of Retief
warmly, bidding him “Hamba gachle,” that is, Depart gently, or in
peace. He retreated towards the gate of the labyrinth, and as he went the
Boers took off their hats, waving them in the air and cheering him. He
was almost through it, and I began to breathe again.
Doubtless I was mistaken. After all, no treachery was intended.
In the very opening of the gate Dingaan turned, however, and said two
words in Zulu which mean: “Seize them!”
Instantly the warriors, who had now danced quite close and were waiting for these words, rushed upon the Boers.5

Andries Pretorius, another voortrekker called upon to lead the pioneers and avenge the murder, claimed to possess a copy of the pact,
which served as a banner for his commando unit. The almost six hundred man band marched for the Zulu capital, Umgungundlovu, in late
November. On arriving in Waschbank in mid-December, the commandos pledged that if God granted them victory, they would consecrate
the day and keep it holy. They made contact with groups of Zulu warriors and on the fourteenth of December, came to the site of what is
today Blood River, ideally situated to stand and face the Zulu army.
The voortrekkers awaited the Zulu attack, which began on December
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16, 1838. Their cannons were loaded with pieces of metal that cut to
pieces the Zulu regiments, who then took shelter in the riverbed,
where they were slaughtered. Some 3,000 Zulus were killed; the
voortrekkers suffered three wounded. The pact between the Boers and
Zulu, so treacherously broken, served as mirror to the Vow, sworn
upon the plain of the Blood River.
The flight of the Boers to the interior and their search for freedom
from the British had given them fifty years of relative independence
from the Empire. This came to an end with the discovery of vast mineral and metal resources, which attracted the attention of the British
Empire. As had so often been true in the past, the Empire advanced
slowly, forming alliances with native factions, pitting them against one
another, and then betraying erstwhile allies once they had served their
purpose. What made the telling of the story so piquant in South Africa
was the white tellers who controlled public discourse for so long. If the
reigning account of the conflicts of 1838 cast the Zulu in the role of the
base savage, incapable of civilized sentiments such as honor and dignity, the tale of 1879 cast the Zulu as the noble native, incapable of
withstanding the foul machinations of the empire. That the Boers
themselves would be attacked by these same forces within a year, a
trauma repeated two decades later in the Anglo-Boer War, made the
rhetoric all the more important. Preceding immediately the bitter conflict between British and the Boers — the so-called First War of Independence — the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 placed the old antagonists,
the Boer and the Zulu, in a position of odd equivalence. Conquerors
were now in the position of the colonized.
British interest in the interior rose in the late 1870s, drawn by the
discovery of vast diamond resources and a desire to consolidate imperial dominion. Tensions culminated in the 1877 annexation of the
South African Republic by the British Empire. The Boer population
found itself once again threatened, and would soon embark upon
twenty years of war. Yet the first armed encounters of the Empire were
against the Zulu, who represented a diminished but still significant
military force. Magnifying a series of border incidents into a Zulu
threat, the British issued an ultimatum to the Zulu King Cetshwayo in
December 1878, prelude to the invasion of January 1879. Three British
columns under the overall command of Lord Chelmsford advanced
rapidly into Zulu territory, so that by January 22, military forces in several locations were in close proximity to the Zulu. The first encounter
took place by the rock pinnacle of Isandlwana, resulting in the annihi-
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lation of the British detachment of twelve hundred men. As the tale
was told by South African historians and relayed through popular culture by a variety of mediators, the savage fury of the concentrated
Zulu impi swept aside the brave British. There were many tales of
British heroism to be told; in fact, the defeat resulted in one of the most
lavish awardings of Victoria Crosses known to the British Army. Most
heroic of all were the men who managed to flee and warn the British
outpost at Rorke’s Drift. Although the Battle of Isandlwana resulted in
a defeat that shook the British Empire and lodged itself in South
African mythology, equally important battles, including the battle at
Khambula, resulted in the defeat and demoralization of the Zulu
forces. The campaign was very quickly over. The mission at Rorke’s
Drift is still a tourist site, yet Khambula can scarcely be found on a
tourist map, nor mention heard in South African retellings of the story.
Historical revision is a constant process, instigated by the discovery
of new facts, and by the development of new agendas for storytellers.
The end of apartheid in South Africa and the advent of black rule in
the country has provoked a critical reexamination of the past, yet it has
proven that some moments are more resistant than others to revision.
Certainly, this has been the case with the Battle of Blood River, with its
uncontested narrative of white supremacy. The site still stands as a
monument, with sixty-four bronze wagons circled in the commando
laager, and a stone tablet in the middle still announcing the sacred
vow. Some say that if the site once symbolized Boer grit and perseverance. It now represents stubbornness in the face of historical reality.
Even more powerful a testament to the historical moment is the massive Voortrekker Monument, built outside Pretoria in 1949, and standing untouched to this day. Set high above the city, the monument
narrates the seizure of the interior lands in the way that most fully
legitimates white rule. It holds the history of God’s will frozen in marble around the interior. The famous friezes tell the story of the trek,
starting with the model Boer community that made it, the cruel setbacks that the pioneers endured, and the savage Zulu who attacked
the pioneers unprovoked and massacred them. Highlights of the
panorama include the first encounters of Boer and Zulu; tour guides
relate the savage customs of the tribe, embodied in the frieze by the
servant of the king whose cupped hands served as spittoon. Battle
scenes feature the wild Zulu hordes throwing themselves on the
entrenched Boer positions, helpless in the face of European cool-headedness and technology. Tour guides pause with particular relish
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before the frieze showing Boer women calmly shooting a chain of Zulu
warriors fording the river.
The monument is bound to the Blood River complex by its moment
of origin, the vow sworn by the embattled pioneers on December 16,
1838, and commemorated every December 16th since. The tomb of Pretorious, deep in the bowels of the monument, is illuminated by a ray of
sun once a year on that day. These are all anchors fixed in the past.
Even in post-apartheid days, that ray of sun still illuminates Pretorious, and the monument still seems to hold the same meaning it did for
many of its visitors. The day of the covenant and the places that it sanctified are still the focal point of the monument, even now that December 16 has been declared the Day of Reconciliation. The massive stone
monument and its marble narrative are inert in the face of revision, a
non-dialogic tale built of friezes. Blood River is still a site where resolute Boer nationalists of the Volksfront or even the Afrikaner Weerstandsbewegin can gather for their celebrations.6 All the divisions
inherent in the site and its history were evident in 1998, when the
Inkatha Freedom Party-led government of KwaZulu-Natal unveiled
its “counter-monument” across the river from the site. Opened on
December 16, the day featured two entirely separate celebrations.
Although the Afrikaners had no objections to the monument, the chair
of the Foundation for Blood River expressed the sentiments of many
when he said that because of the different histories, there was no way a
single function could be held to mark December 16. “Two different
cultures are involved.” ANC officials protested as well, claiming that
the new monument was being used for sectarian purposes.7
The myth of Blood River has survived the undermining of its factual
foundation. Many historians doubt that the putative pact between
Retief and Dingaan ever existed, the violation of which justified the
cruelty of the vengeance. Others point out that the sacred vow may
well never have taken place. Yet others question whether it was the
savage nature of the Zulu that caused the disastrous relationship
between Boer and native, when the Europeans had similar dealings
with other very different native groups, such as the Khosa peoples.
*****
Things stand very differently with the narrative of Isandlwana. The
tale has always been more open to retelling, and always the site of
many voices long before 1994, and it continues to be long after. A visit
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to the battle site gives no indication of the contestation. Deep in the
heart of the Zulu Reserve, accessible by miles of dirt road, the rocky
field at the foot of Black’s Koppie still bears the same British monuments erected early in the century celebrating the heroism of the
British dead. Several monuments stand on the site, but most eloquent
are the white stone cairns strewn about the battlefield where the
British made their stand and fell. None of these monuments has been
touched now that the historical preserve has passed to the control of
the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. In fact, nothing has been
added, perhaps because the meager monuments are so overwhelmed
by the vast landscape surrounding them.
The revision has taken place in the retelling of the story, and what is
surprising is the degree to which revisions coming from various parts
of South African society concur in their strategies. Three versions of
the tale of Isandlwana, each in its own way representing a prominent
voice in society, bear examination. The first will be the Reader’s Digest
Illustrated History of South Africa (1989), the most prominent and controversial revision of history to be published in apartheid South Africa.
The second will be the contemporary musical ZULU! (full title: The
Zulu: The Battle of Isandlwana: The Epic Story of King Cetshwayo ka
Mpande), written and directed by Mbongeni Ngema, performed in the
Johannesburg Market Square Theater, and soon to tour the world.
Finally, we will listen to the story in the words of Steve Rattray, a local
historical guide based at the Fugitive’s Drift Lodge, a site involved in
the Battle of Isandlwana. Rattray is a white South African born and
raised in the territory around Dundee, whose clientele at the lodge is
predominantly white and wealthy. Although most of the guests at the
lodge are foreigners, his work is well known to local whites, and he is
regarded by them to be the leading teller of the tale.
Isandlwana represents all the interpretative dynamics of the South
African narrative, few of which are present in the story of Blood River.
There are stories of bravery and treachery on both sides. Blunders and
stratagems were devised by the leaders of both, and the tale allows for
the Zulu and white tellers of the tale to imagine themselves as the victims of imperial onslaught, ignoring for the moment their own colonizing histories. The treatment of Isandlwana in the Reader’s Digest History
suggests why the battle was a more suitable candidate for revision.
Blood River, as the history pointed out and questioned, was based on
two myths fundamental to apartheid:
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the popular view of Bible-clutching Boers taking their righteous revenge
against the Zulu who had wickedly murdered one of their leaders, Piet
Retief, after ceding to him vast areas of their land in a document that
modern researchers believe never existed. Even if it had, could the Zulu
King Dingane, reared in a society based on community ownership of
land, really have understood what he was signing?
Yet another version of the same historical attitude would have us believe
that the land claimed by the Voortrekkers, particularly on the highveld,
was empty, having been depopulated during years of warfare as the
Zulu kingdom struggled to assert itself in what is now Natal.8

Isandlwana brings to the fore a different set of villains — the British,
in particular the commander of the campaign, Lord Chelmsford. The
absolute confidence that Chelmsford brought to his encounters with
the Zulu and Boer embodied the arrogance of the British Empire, and
Chelmsford has devolved into a buffoon figure in many South African
accounts of the campaign. In the production of ZULU!, Chelmsford
alone came in for an exclusively unsympathetic account, played with
particular relish by a black actor in high comic style. Oddly enough,
Chelmsford is usually contrasted to the positive figure of Major
Anthony Durnford, commander at Isandlwana, who fought bravely to
the end, and is credited with the famous final command to his men:
“Fix bayonets and die like British soldiers do.”
The narrative tradition of apartheid South Africa devoted a great
deal of attention to British strategies and maneuvers at Isandlwana,
and very little to the Zulu. Savage customs, such as tearing open the
bodies of the enemy, receive considerably more attention.9 Revisionist
versions use Chelmsford’s folly to represent the Zulu as a strategically
deployed military force. The howling savages of the Voortrekker Monument, who dumbly throw themselves on the modern weaponry of
the Europeans regardless of their own horrible losses, are replaced by
wise and deliberate military planners. In ZULU!, the ghost of the king
Ceteshwayo is placed center stage over the scene of the conflict, surveying it from an objective distance and explaining the course of the
battle. The figure explains to the audience the “buffalo horns” pincer
movement devised first by Shaka, and deployed successfully at Isandlwana. Thus, the distance embodied by the stage placement of the figure and by his narrative of the battle afford the Zulu leader a rational
discourse unavailable to the buffoon figure Chelmsford. The revisionist strategy is made explicit by the local guide Rattray, who begins his
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narration of the battle with the phrase “In this age of reconciliation it is
time for us to acknowledge . . . ,” going on to describe the Zulu battle
strategy in great detail, and making it the source of the Zulu victory.10
The narrative stance of South African tellers of the Isandlwana tale
suggests much of its power. In the Market Square production of
ZULU!, there is a revisionist fervor, an unjustified insistence that this
story has been neglected that suggests how the battle has been narrated through the prism of the present. In fact, Isandlwana has always
been given a prominence in tellings of the Anglo-Zulu War that goes
beyond its actual significance. When the white South African Rattray
tells the story, it is as a rich source of local lore mined from both white
and Zulu sources. Rattray’s story devotes considerable time to establishing his rights to the folkloric voice. As is often the case for Natal
whites of his generation, Rattray grew up alongside the Zulu boys of
his district, speaking their language. Referring to long conversations
with Zulu elders conducted in their language, and often citing those
elders in their own language before he provides the English, Rattray
weaves a variety of voices into his narrative. Ignoring the implications
of appropriating the Zulu voice, he cuts back and forth between Zulu
and English accounts. This allows him to demonstrate the full power
of the Zulu strategy, the folly of Chelmsford’s invasion plan, and the
heroism of warriors on both sides. It also bolsters the frequent plea
heard throughout the telling to use Isandlwana as a source of common
cause rather than division.
If Isandlwana offers a crossing of identities, this is no more evident
than in the use of crossover figures to tell the story. An interesting
aspect of ZULU! is the use of transitional figures and intermediaries to
tell the tale. The traditional focus of the story is relegated to the background, and instead it highlights the voice of Nomguqo (played by the
company’s leading actress, Leleti Khumalo-Ngema), a Zulu princess
who assumed a position between the cultures by her acceptance of
Christianity. Even more interesting is the role of the Natal Native Contingent in the battle. The NNC, manned by black troops and white officers, fought against the Zulu for the British, and represent the
liminality of the situation for both sides. Many of these men hailed
from the tribes routed from the region by the mfecane. Both Ngema and
Rattray feature their voices in the narrative, and the convergence is so
strong that many of the same quotes are used. One voice that stands
out in the narrative belongs to Sergeant-Major Simeon Kambule, who
survived the battle and provided one of the leading accounts. His
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words are used by both Ngema and Rattray in ways that highlight the
place in between two cultures occupied by the NNC.11
The debate, then, as it is conducted through the revision of the battle
tales, concerns the origins of the South African state and republic, and,
perhaps more importantly, the origins of South Africanism. The latter
term is most problematic. For a population as diverse as the southern
African, the notions of nation and nationalism are too far off to serve as
sources of unity. Neither is there any moment of unity in the distant
past, even the mythic past. European South Africans, the creators of
the political entity of South Africa and, moreover, the carriers of the
geographic consciousness that could designate the land South Africa,
arrived already as colonizer and seizer of land.
*****
One of the many oddities of South African history is that its point of
origin, the events of the year 1838, came long after the arrival of Europeans and a significant stretch of time before South Africa was formed
out of its disparate territories. It was formed precisely in the bloody
confrontation between Boer and Zulu. The confrontation took place
when the Boers were in flight from the British Empire, and on land
abandoned by people in flight from the Zulu. Thus, the moment
allowed the Boers to define themselves as the colonized other, and their
Zulu attackers as the colonizer. That very same moment allows the
Zulu to conceive of themselves as victims of colonial incursion. The
war of 1879 heightened the sense of historical embattlement, and, by
its odd identification of Boer and Zulu, allowed the Boer historical
imagination a place within the Zulu framework.
Unique among the formative events of South African history, the
Anglo-Zulu War accommodates a revision in line with the imperatives
of post-apartheid society. If the conflict of 1838, embodied in the
bronze of the Blood River Monument and the cold stone of the
Voortrekker Monument, offers little revision and none that will accommodate other peoples within its framework of identification, the
Anglo-Zulu War offers many. In fact, even during apartheid days, the
story was told with that potential evident. Thus, although the
moments of antagonism differ some, the tale of Isandlwana is told in
remarkably similar ways in the Market Theater of Johannesburg and
by Steve Rattray to his white clients and neighbors in KwaZulu-Natal.
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For all the spirit of reconciliation — to echo a contemporary term
used so consciously by many of the tellers — offered by the battle saga,
there are also aspects that harbor greater peril for South African
democracy. The first is that the tale, perhaps by its very foundations,
reinforces and perhaps amplifies the understanding of the basic agent
of history to be the ethnos. In all these versions, ethnicities and tribes
become indistinguishable, and they serve as undifferentiated units of
cultural, social, and historical identity. The historicity of the actors,
which is the element that most undermines foundational claims to territory, seems to disappear by common assent. White European and
black Zulu clash upon the battlefields of KwaZulu-Natal as if they represent eternal, aboriginal principles—black and white, as it were.
The reduction of the saga to the clash of two peoples, two types,
though an effective narrative device, serves to remove other groups
from the narrative of origin. Perhaps most striking is the absence of the
many peoples driven out of the Natal territory by the mfecane, many of
them Sotho-speaking, whose role in South African history is major, but
whose voice is absent. Without this historical background, liminal figures such as the Natal Native Contigent lose their acute historical significance. Even more politically sensitive is the absence of the Khosa
peoples from this narrative of South Africa. During the same historical
period, the Khosa were subject to similar colonial pressures, and found
themselves deprived of their territorial and political integrity. Their
lives were deeply affected by the migrations instigated by the mfecane.
Yet they are absent from the tale of origin. The contemporary politics
of this occlusion are glaring. Though justified by tradition, they serve
white cultural politics by leaving the voortrekkers at the center of the
story, and Zulu cultural politics as well. The battlefields are presently
administered by the IFP-controlled provincial government. If their
policies toward the monuments are acceptable to white residents of the
province, and anger only the ANC, this might well be why.
Thus, a story that seems on one hand to highlight a relationship
between peoples — Boer and Zulu — actually serves to exclude many
participants. If the Khosa have other ways of asserting their role in
South African history, this is not true of others. What of the Sothospeaking peoples, swept aside first by the Zulu, robbed by the
voortrekkers, and then marginalized when they came to Khosa lands?
Their voice is absent from this tale, as it is in the contemporary politics
of South Africa. This reading of the historical narrative of South Africa
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can be even more divisive than the original reading, and as dangerous
for the new South Africa. 嘷
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